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NO HELP FROM ABOVE: STRYCKER'S BAY
NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL, INC. v. KARLEN
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969' (NEPA) imposes
upon administrative agencies a "continuing responsibility" to pre-
serve and protect the environment.2 To insure fulfillment of this re-
sponsibility, environmentalists often call upon the judiciary to
examine the legitimacy of agency action which adversely affects the
environment.' Courts reviewing administrative action under NEPA
must determine whether the agency gave environmental factors suffi-
cient consideration in its decisionmaking process.4 The proper scope
of agency consideration has eluded many courts.' In Strycker's Bay
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). For the legislative history of NEPA, see H.R.
REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751-73. For general dis-
cussions of NEPA, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973); W. RODGERS,
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697-834 (1977); Goperlud, NEPA4 at Nine:
Alive and Well or Wounded in Action? 55 N.D. L. REV. 497 (1979).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976).
3. Neither NEPA nor its legislative history mentions judicial review. Courts have
had to decide whether the Act implicitly confers jurisdiction or whether it must be
found under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and other statutes. See Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States (SCRAP
I), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). The first NEPA case to reach the Supreme Court, SCA4P I
reversed the lower court's holding that NEPA implicitly confers jurisdiction on fed-
eral courts to enjoin NEPA related agency action. Id. at 690.
4. See generally RODGERS, supra note 1, at 738-50 (1977); Cohen & Warren, Judi-
cial Recognition ofthe Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 685 (1972); Leventhal, EnvironmentalDeci-
sionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
5. While the actual standard of review has eluded the courts, all have demon-
strated a willingness to examine agency action under NEPA. Scholars believe the
primary reason for the positive reception is public concern. In the last fifteen years
people have voiced their concerns more strongly about the effects administrative
agency actions have on their rights. They have united to form public interest groups
to contest agency actions. Due to heightened concern for the environment, public
interest foundations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, as well as community groups, such as Scenic Hudson Pres-
ervation Conference, Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, and Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, have had sufficient support to adjudicate the widely shared views of
their constituents. Courts applaud this representation. It constitutes an alternative to
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Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,6 the Supreme Court held that,
under NEPA, a reviewing court's role should extend only to insuring
that agencies "consider" environmental factors.
The original litigation in Strycker's Bay stemmed from a proposed
urban redevelopment project on Manhattan's Upper West Side.7
The project initially provided for a 70% to 30% ratio of middle- to
low-income housing.' This ratio resulted in an insufficient number of
low-income housing units.9 To alleviate this shortage, the project
planners, the City of New York Planning Commission (the Commis-
sion) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD), decided to devote one portion'0 of the
redevelopment area solely to low-income housing."I
Plaintiff Trinity Episcopal School Corporation sued to enjoin con-
struction, contending that the Commission and HUD violated NEPA
by failing to file an environmental impact statement (EIS).'" The dis-
using polling booths to express local or national environmental concerns. It also pro-
vides for more effective representation of the interests affected by administrative
agency decisions. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 16-27 (1973); Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1760-70 (1975).
6. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
7. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1049-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). In 1956, the City of New York received a federal grant to study a
twenty square block area to determine the feasibility of an urban renewal project.
The study concluded that the area, though deteriorating, was structurally sound.
Based on this finding, the West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA) plan evolved.
The City of New York Planning Commission and the federal Department of Housing
and Urban Development began to formulate the plan in 1959. It envisaged the reha-
bilitation and preservation of existing structures to accommodate the needs of the
community's residents. Id.
8. Id. at 1057. The planners sought to promote economic and racial integration
through the 70% to 30% ratio. Id.
9. Id. at 1055.
10. Id. at 1071, 1075. The planners broke the twenty square block area into over
45 sites to facilitate implementation of the redevelopment project. Id. at 1047, 1057.
They chose to convert all residential units on Site 30 into low-income housing units.
As proposed, Site 30 would contain 160 public housing units. Id. at 1055-56.
11. Id. at 1055-56.
12. Id. at 1048. Plaintiff originally brought suit on four grounds. First, it alleged
the city had breached its contract with them by making changes after execution of the
contract. Id. Secondly, it claimed the city should have secured consent from the
residents of the areas where the middle to low income ratios were changed. Id.
Thirdly, it queried whether construction of only public housing on site 30 would "tip"
the area, thereby causing middle income residents to flee. Id. at 1048, 1063. Lastly,
the plaintiff charged that defendants failed to comply with NEPA's requirements. Id.
at 1048. Only the NEPA issue went beyond the court of appeals.
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trict court denied an injunction, holding that the change from 30% to
100% low-income housing in one area did not require preparation of
a full-scale EIS. 13 The Second Circuit reversed. 4  Although it
agreed that the defendants did not have to prepare an EIS, it ordered
HUD to prepare a statement discussing alternatives to 100% low-in-
come housing. 15
HUD explored the reasonable alternatives and found none of them
acceptable. 6 The district court examined HUD's study and, satisfied
with its thoroughness, again refused to enjoin construction. x7 The
13. Id. at 1079-82. The district court decided the alleged antisocial propensities of
low income residents and the fear that an increase of low income residents would
jeopardize community stability were insufficient reasons to require HUD to fie an
EIS. Id. at 1079.
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), requires an agency to file an
EIS whenever it proposes a major federal action which will significantly affect "the
quality of the human environment." This does not restrict the filing of an EIS to
instances when the proposed action will create pollution or destroy open land. It
includes social, cultural, and aesthetic impacts as well. See Hanley v. Mitchell, 460
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding environmental assessment incomplete because
agency failed to examine effect of proposed jail on surrounding neighborhood); Ely v.
Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (NEPA requires consideration of cultural as well
as physical environmental effects of proposed projects); Como-Falcon Coalition v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 465 F. Supp. 850 (D. Minn. 1978) (NEPA requires
consideration of effect of project upon the urban environment, including health and
public safety, social services, zoning and land use, and community's development pol-
icy). But see I.M.A.G.E. of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.
1978) (NEPA is primarily concerned with project impact upon the physical environ-
ment; socio-economic effects alone may not trigger need for EIS.
14. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1975).
15. Id. at 94. NEPA requires EIS's only for "major" federal actions "significantly
affecting" the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). An agency, however,
must study and discuss alternative courses of action to "any proposal which involves
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." Id.
§ 4332(2)(E). HUD originally filed a Special Environmental Clearance statement dis-
cussing the impact of the proposed project. The only reference in the study to alterna-
tives was an adoptation of the New York City Housing Authority's study of
alternatives. The Second Circuit decided that HUD could not accept a local agency's
conclusion; it must conduct an exploration of alternatives on its own. 523 F.2d at 94.
16. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204, 215-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). HUD's Special Clearance Study discussed alternatives to construction of 100%
low income housing units on Site 30. The agency concluded that relocation of the low
income housing project to another area with WSURA would not solve any racially
motivated problems; it would only change the complainants. HUD also considered
alternative building designs and the possibility of dispersing low income units over
more sites. The increased cost of either alternative, however, would only serve to
further strain the class relations of WSURA residents. Id. at 215-16.
17. Id. at 220, 223. Much of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of the contents
1981]
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Second Circuit reversed, concluding that HUD rejected preferable al-
ternatives solely because they would result in a two-year construction
delay."8 Declaring delay an inappropriate determining factor, 19 the
court remanded the case, instructing HUD to find another way to
solve the low-income housing shortage.20
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. 2' In a per curiam opin-
ion, the majority concluded that a court reviewing agency decision-
making under NEPA can require only that the agency adhere to the
Act's procedural mandate to "consider" environmental factors.22
Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that such limited review of
agency decisions would render the reviewing court's task mindless.23
NEPA requires that federal agencies follow certain procedures 24 to
effectuate its long-term goals of managing and preserving the envi-
ronment.' In order to comply with the Act, agencies must consider
of HUD's Special Clearance Study. See id. at 209-18. At no time does the court
discuss the significance the delay factor played in HUD's rejection of alternatives.
Regarding HUD's analysis of alternatives, the district court found that HUD consid-
ered all relevant factors, including design, site selection, relocation of residents, quali-
ty of the final structure, impact of the environment on current residents and their
activities, and the existence of local support services to satisfy the needs of new resi-
dents. Id. at 220.
18. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1979). Karlen v. Harris was the first
case in which a court enjoined agency action because it conflicted with NEPA's sub-
stantive goals. For this reason, the case stood as "the high water mark among 'sub-
stantive NEPA cases'." Comment, Charting the Boundaries of NEPAs Substantive
Mandate: Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 10 E.L.R. 10039,
10043 (1980).
19. 590 F.2d at 44-45. The court ruled environmental factors such as overcrowd-
ing should determine the choice of alternatives. Id. at 44.
20. Id. at 45.
21. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
22. Id. at 227.
23. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. See NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
25. Section 101 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976), reads in pertinent part:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, ... declares that it
is the continuing policy of the Federal Government... to use all practicable
means and measures... in a manner calculated to foster and promote the gen-
eral welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony....
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continu-
ing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
[Vol. 21:301
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environmental factors during their decisionmaking process.26 Courts
examining agency compliance have had great difficulty articulating
and applying a proper standard of review.27 Consequently, two con-
coordinate Federal plans, functions, and resources to the end that the Nation
may [attain broad national goals in management of the environment].
26. Under NEPA, § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), federal agencies
must prepare detailed environmental impact statements on all "major federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." An environmen-
tal impact statement must cover.
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. For discussions of the proper content of an environmental impact statement, see
Karp, Judicial Review of Environmental Impact Statement Contents, 16 AM. Bus. L.J.
127 (1978); Note, The Environmental Impact Statement Requirement in Agency En-
forcement Adjudication, 91 HAav. L. REv. 815 (1978).
27. Courts may examine agency action at four different stages during preparation
of an environmental impact statement. First, a court may examine an agency's
threshold determination not to prepare an EIS since its proposed action does not fall
within the classification of a "major" federal action "significantly" affecting the quali-
ty of the environment. Second, judicial review may follow a challenge by environ-
mental groups of the adequacy of an agency's procedural compliance with Section
102(2) of the Act. Third, courts will review agency action when environmentalists
challenge the adequacy of the substance of an EIS. Finally, courts will examine
agency action when environmental groups allege an agency's decision to continue
with a project disregards the findings set forth in an otherwise properly completed
EIS. Leed, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Is the Fact of Compliance
a Procedural or Substantive Que.rtion? 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 303, 311-15 (1975).
Since the enactment of NEPA, courts have applied five different standards of re-
view to these issues. First, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-
706 (1976), sets forth the arbitrary and capricious standard. Under this standard a
reviewing court may set aside an agency decision if it is arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion. Id. § 706(2)(A). For cases employing this standard, see Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (APA requires a review-
ing court to engage in a "substantial inquiry"); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946,
953 (7th Cir. 1973) (courts should review agency decisions on the merits to determine
whether they are arbitrary and capricious); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829-
30 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding there is no reason to deviate from APA standard of review
since it allows for effective judicial scrutiny).
The second standard, the substantial evidence test, also is derived from the APA
and permits limited judicial review of agency decisions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) (evidence supported a finding that the agency complied
with NEPA's mandates). Under the third standard, the judicially-created rational
1981)
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fficting approaches have emerged. Some courts examine the substan-
tive merits of the agency decision.28 Others merely insure that the
agency has complied with NEPA's procedural mandates.29
The District of Columbia Circuit effectively established a standard
of limited substantive review of agency action under NEPA in Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission.3° In Calvert CIffs', the court determined that a review-
ing court should examine the actual reasoning behind agency ac-
tion.31 The court recognized that agencies often have difficulty
respecting environmental interests because of competing economic
basis standard, the court examines the agency decision to determine whether there is a
rational basis for it. See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (judicial scrutiny to ensure NEPA's
policies were not being frustrated or ignored). Fourth, the judicially-created reasona-
bleness standard allows for some agency discretion. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510
F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975) (compliance with Section 102(2) of NEPA is governed by a
"rule of reason"). Finally, some courts use the APA standard of de novo review, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1976), on the ground that agencies should not exercise discretion.
See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (agency
action of summarily terminating a contract without first complying with NEPA's
mandates is erroneous). See Comment, NEPA Threshold Determinations: A Frame-
work of Analysis, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 71, 82-87 (1976).
28. For cases applying a substantive standard of judicial review, see Sierra Club
v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973) (concluding EIS lacked the requisite detail
to comply with NEPA's full-disclosure requirement); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282
(1st Cir. 1973) (holding proper judicial review requires examination of the entire rec-
ord); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir.
1973) (rejecting district court's ruling that EIS need only identify, not discuss, alterna-
tives).
29. A number of cases have held that procedural compliance with NEPA suffices.
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973)
(agency circulation of properly prepared EIS satisfies NEPA's requirements); City of
New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (upon finding good
faith compliance with NEPA's procedural mandates, reviewing court essentially has
fulfilled its duty).
30. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 115. Numerous subsequent cases have approved the Calvert Clifs' view
that a reviewing court should examine the record upon which an agency bases its
decision. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir.
1972) (reviewing court should examine both the environmental impact statement and
the transcript of the lower court proceeding); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 640 (2d
Cir. 1972) (NEPA requires agencies to develop a complete reviewable record; a per-
functory explanation of the agency's reasoning is insufficient); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (NEPA requires production of a record showing agency complied
with procedural requirements and considered the factors specified).
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and technical concerns. 2 To insure appropriate consideration,33 the
court found NEPA requires agencies to balance environmental fac-
tors against economic and technical factors.34 Accordingly, a court
has authority to examine the agency's decisionmaking process to de-
termine whether it reasonably reflects proper consideration and bal-
ancing of the statutorily mandated factors.35
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Gillham
Dam),36 perhaps the most expansive interpretation of NEPA,37 the
32. 449 F.2d at 1113. Environmental amenities generally increase costs. Agencies
hesitant to overextend themselves financially prefer to ignore the environmental con-
sequences in favor of more economical proposals.
33. Id. at 1112. Section 102(2)(B) of NEPA requires agencies to "consider" envi-
ronmental factors in the same way they "consider" other factors within their statutory
mandates. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976). The term "consider" can be interpreted
many ways. It may mean that an agency must make great efforts to avoid detrimental
environmental consequences. On the other hand, it may mean that an agency merely
must recognize the environmental impact its action will have.
The Calyert Ciffs' court rejected the idea that mechanical compliance with the pro-
cedural mandates of NEPA will suffice. It found that the § 102 mandate that agencies
consider environmental factors "to the fullest extent possible" sets a very high stan-
dard. 449 F.2d at 1114. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-
neers (Tennessee Tombigee), 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974) (NEPA requires full
consideration of environmental factors, not formalistic paper shuffling); Sierra Club
v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973) (discussion of environmental impacts and
alternatives cannot be superficial); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (Ist Cir. 1973)
(agency EIS must explain the course of inquiry, analysis, and reasoning to comply
with NEPA); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 371
F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'dper curiam, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974) (EIS
must discuss environmental impacts in detail); Conservation Soc. of Southern Vt. v.
Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975) (agency must show willingness to modify or drop
proposed project if environmental costs outweigh benefits). Cf. National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973) (courts should look for adequacy in
EIS's, not perfection).
34. 449 F.2d at 1113. Senator Jackson, who sponsored NEPA in the Senate, had
discussed the necessity of a balancing process during the congressional hearings. See
115 CONG. REC. 29055 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
35. 449 F.2d at 1115 (1971).
36. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972). Plaintiffs in
Gillham Dam sought to enjoin construction of the dam on the ground that the deci-
sion to construct it was "arbitrary and capricious" and contrary to the policies set
forth in section 101 of NEPA. The district court held that NEPA falls short of creat-
mg the substantive rights plaintiffs claimed. 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the procedural requirements of NEPA
exist for the specific purpose of achieving the policy objectives set forth in section 101.
470 F.2d at 297.
37. The Eighth Circuit somewhat limited this expansive interpretation in subse-
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Eighth Circuit expressly recognized the judicial power to substan-
tively review agency actions.38 The court reasoned that the Calvert
Cliffs' balancing process and NEPA's procedural requirements place
an obligation upon agencies to carry out the Act's substantive poli-
cies. A correlative obligation therefore arises in the judiciary to re-
view substantive agency actions on the merits.39 This prospect of
substantive review insures that agencies consider environmental ef-
fects more thoroughly and, as a result, promotes NEPA's broad pur-
poses.4°
The Supreme Court discussed the breadth of the judiciary's role in
reviewing agency action under NEPA only twice prior to Strycker's
Bay. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,4' the Court dealt primarily with
NEPA's requirements for the production of an EIS.42 It concluded
that a reviewing court has no authority to create a test of its own since
the Act clearly defines the point at which an EIS becomes neces-
sary.43 Relegating its discussion of the role of a reviewing court to a
quent decisions. In Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292
(8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1976), the court acknowledged its obligation
to review substantive agency decisions on the merits. It stated, however, that this
review is "extremely narrow," limited to an examination of whether the agency made
its decision in good faith, giving sufficient weight to environmental values. Id. at
1300.
38. 470 F.2d at 299.
39. 470 F.2d at 298.
40. Id. at 299. The court found support for its conclusion regarding substantive
review in other circuits. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reaffirming Calvert Clfs" premise that courts can only
reverse agency decisions which are clearly erroneous); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972)
(courts must review the merits of an agency decision); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130,
1138-39 (4th Cir. 1971) (the purpose of environmental impact studies is to create a
reviewable record); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reviewing court must examine
agency's decisionmaking process to ensure that it balanced environmental and
financial factors). See also Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d
1309 (1978) (finding substantive review of agency actions under state statute patterned
after NEPA permissible under a "clearly erroneous" test).
41. 427 U.S. 390 (1978).
42. Id. at 405. Kleppe has been analyzed in numerous law review articles. See
generally Note, Interior Department Not Required by NEPAl to Prepare Comprehensive
Regional Environmental Impact Statement on Coal Development Prior to Formal
Agency Proposal, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 410 (1977); Case Note, When Does Section 102(2)(C)
ofNEPA Require Preparation of a Regional Impact Statement?, 12 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 195 (1977); Recent Decisions, 26 EMORY L.J. 231 (1977).
43. 427 U.S. at 406.
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footnote,44 the Court adopted a viewpoint previously set forth in both
the District of Columbia45 and Second Circuits.' When reviewing
agency action subject to NEPA's mandates, a court may not substi-
tute its judgment for the agency's. 47  It can only insure that the
agency gave environmental factors a "hard look" before making its
decision. 48 An agency, therefore, according to the Kleppe Court,
must seriously examine the environmental impact of its actions.49
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,50 the Supreme Court examined the sufficiency of
44. Id. at 410 n.21.
45. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
46, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 481 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
47. 427 U.S. at 410 n.21.
48. Id. The actual meaning of "hard look" is quite amorphous. The term
originated outside of the NEPA context. In WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153,
1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court discussed the meaning of the term in a footnote. It
stated that the agency need not "author an essay. . . it suffices, in the usual case, that
we can discern the 'why and wherefore."' Id. at 1157 n.9.
NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), was the first NEPA case to em-
ploy the term. The court stressed that courts should work in collaboration with, not in
opposition to, agencies. It stated it would not interject itself within the area of agency
discretion nor impose unreasonable requirements so long as the agency has taken a
"hard look" at environmental consequences. Id. at 838. Thus, the term leaves the
depth of any "looking" up to the discretion of the court.
49. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court applied the "plain language" rule
to its interpretation of NEPA's EIS requirement. Under the "plain language" ap-
proach, an agency can still consider and ignore environmental factors. Some scholars
have suggested this defeats the Congressional intent of NEPA. Moreover, even where
the Congressional intent is clear, as in the mandate that agencies consider environ-
mental factors, neither the statute nor its legislative history offers much guidance as to
how to carry out that intent. An amendment could alleviate these problems. See
Note, When Does Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA Require Preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement?, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 195, 213-14 (1977).
50. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee consolidated two cases. The first dealt
with the propriety of the Atomic Energy Commission's rulemaking procedures. The
lower court had concluded that the AEC's rulemaking procedings, though in compli-
ance with Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1976), were insufficient and remanded the matter to the AEC. NRDC v. United
States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Supreme
Court had to determine whether NEPA requires procedures beyond those set out in
the APA when an agency investigates factual issues through rulemaking. It con-
cluded that NEPA does not require additional procedures. 435 U.S. at 548. NEPA
mandates only the procedures expressly contained in the Act itself. Id.
The second issue before the Court addressed the propriety of an AEC decision
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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's procedures for granting con-
struction and operating licenses for nuclear power plants. At the end
of the opinion, the Court made a passing observation regarding the
applicability ofNEPA.5 Although the Act sets forth substantive pol-
icies for the nation as a whole, NEPA's mandate to federal agencies is
essentially procedural.52 While courts should insure that agency de-
cisions are "fully informed," they must restrict their examination of
agency decisionmaking processes to that inquiry. 3 The intent of the
Court in replacing the Kleppe "hard look" standard with a "fully-
informed and well-considered" standard is unclear. It may have in-
tended to articulate a less stringent standard. It is possible, however,
it simply chose to use a different but analogous descriptive phrase.54
Strycker's Bay afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to es-
tablish a concise standard of judicial review under NEPA. The court
of appeals had attempted to force HUD to elevate environmental fac-
tors above all others in its decisionmaking 5 The Supreme Court
found this action improper. It held that a reviewing court must con-
duct only a limited examination of the record to insure that the deci-
sionmakers "considered" environmental factors.56 In reaching this
which failed to consider the alternative of energy conservation in its EIS accompany-
ing an application for construction of a nuclear reactor. Aeschliman v. United States
Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court concluded
that NEPA requires investigation of reasonable alternatives. 435 U.S. at 551-52. En-
ergy conservation was not widely recognized when the AEC filed its EIS. The Court
therefore concluded that the Commission was justified in not considering it as an
alternative. Id. at 552-53. See generally Breyer, Byse, Stewart, Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1804 (1978).
51. 435 U.S. at 557.
52. Id. at 558.
53. Id. The Court further stated that policy questions properly resolved in Con-
gress may not be reviewed by courts "under the guise of judicial review of agency
action." Id. See generally Rodgers, 4 Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmen-
tal Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699, 710-12 (1979); Note, Judicial Review
of.Administrative ,4gency 4ction, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 799 (1979).
54. Kleppe deals with the threshold question of whether the agency must prepare
an EIS. Vermont Yankee on the other hand, examines the adequacy of the discussion
of alternatives. The Court's reasoning for using different descriptive terms may stem
from the fact that it was examining different issues. These issues require somewhat
different tests, but not different standards of review.
55. See 444 U.S. at 227; notes 18 & 19 supra.
56. 444 U.S. at 227. The Supreme Court declined to hear oral argument on the
case. Comment, supra note 18 at 10043. Petitions for certiorari were filed by Stryck-
er's Bay Neighborhood Council, the City of New York, and HUD. HUD's petition
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conclusion, the Court relied heavily upon both Vermont Yankee and
Kleppe. It restated the premise that NEPA mandates "fully-in-
formed and well-considered" agency decisions." Nonetheless, it
concluded that courts may not overturn such decisions simply be-
cause they find the results unsatisfactory.58
Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that the majority misread Ver-
mont Yankee.59 He contended that the case does not confine a re-
viewing court to a factual inquiry into whether an agency went
through the motions of "considering" environmental factors.6" Un-
der Vermont Yankee, a court must still set aside an arbitrary and ca-
pricious decision.6' Furthermore, Kleppe requires an agency to give
environmental concerns a "hard look."62 By reading Vermont Yan-
kee so narrowly, Justice Marshall feared that the majority had with-
drawn agency decisionmaking under NEPA from the general rule
that agency decisions must receive careful scrutiny to insure that the
decisionmaker has not acted arbitrarily and capriciously.6 3
The majority opinion in Strycker's Bay offers little guidance to
courts reviewing agency decisionmaking under NEPA. 4 It neither
included the lower court opinions in its appendices. The Special Environmental
Clearance statement, which discussed the alternatives to 100% low income housing on
Site 30 and HUD's reasoning for rejection of the alternatives, was not a part of the
record reviewed by the Supreme Court.
57. 444 U.S. at 227.
58. Id. at 227-28. The Court also cited Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinen-
tal Gas Pipeline Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976), supporting the Kleppe proposition.
59. 444 U.S. at 229. Justice Marshall argued that the Vermont Yankee passage
relied upon by the majority "was meant to be only a further observation of some
relevance" to a particular part of that case. Id.
60. Id. The Court in Vermont Yankee stated that NEPA is essentially procedural.




63. Id. at 23 1. Justice Marshall argued that the Court should determine whether
HUD acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Application of this standard of review re-
quires the court to engage in a" 'searching' and careful judicial inquiry to ensure that
the agency has not exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner." Id. See
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
64. One commentator had predicted prior to Strycker's Bay that given a chance to
answer, once and for all, the question of substantive review under NEPA, the
Supreme Court's response would have little effect. Rodgers, -4 Hard Look at Ver-
mont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.. 699, 710-11
(1979). While substantive NEPA review is a volatile issue, it does not decide many
cases. Rodgers asserts that, even in the absence of NEPA, judicial review of agency
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defines the extent to which agencies must "consider" environmental
factors nor discusses previously developed standards of judicial re-
view.65 The per curiam opinion gives rise to two possible interpreta-
tions. The Court may believe, as Justice Marshall feared, that
cursory consideration of environmental factors is satisfactory.66 On
the other hand, the decision may simply mean that the Court will
sanction the conduct of reviewing courts in the past and refrain from
interfering.
If the Court believes that NEPA requires a minimal "considera-
tion," it eliminates effective judicial review. Under this view, agen-
cies may consider and ignore environmental factors. Yet, as long as
they "consider" these factors, Strycker's Bay precludes courts from
overturning their decisions, regardless of the resulting detriment to
the environment.
If, on the other hand, the ruling indicates the Court's approval of
judicial treatment of NEPA thus far, Strycker's Bay allows reviewing
courts the freedom to continue to develop their own definitions of the
term "consider." While this may result in a wide spectrum of judicial
interpretations, courts acted reasonably in the absence of a definite
standard for ten years. Presumably, they will continue to do so.
The majority's four-line discussion of law renders analysis specula-
tive. The Court had the opportunity to make Strycker's Bay a
landmark decision. Its failure to clearly articulate its view makes the
significance of the case minimal. Reviewing courts most likely will
adopt the latter, less restrictive interpretation. In doing so, they will
actions involving the environment tends to be substantive. Courts often have to de-
fine agency authority and this decision can only be made on the merits. Id.
Another commentator has noted that while the Supreme Court has not taken an
active role in implementing NEPA, it has not tied the hands of lower courts and
agencies either. Goperlud, NEPA at Nine. Alive and Well, or Wounded in Action? 55
N.D. L. REv. 497, 512 (1979). While he made this remark in conjunction with an
analysis of Vermont Yankee, Strycker's Bay does not alter it.
Goperlud also points out that, despite the treatment the Court has given NEPA, the
new Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, which became effective in
1979, are stringent enough to insure protection of NEPA's substantive goals. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 1500.00-1508.28 (1980). The regulations require agencies to conduct in-
depth analyses in conjunction with full discussion of environmental impacts. This
"scoping process" requires agencies to draw up concise, thorough, and relevant state-
ments. Goperlud, supra, at 513-21.
65. The Court could have either hinted at its interpretation of the term "consider"
or discussed the standards developed by lower courts. This would have given courts
some indication of how to proceed when next reviewing a NEPA case.
66. 444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Comment, supra note 18.
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remain free to define and apply their own standards of review to
NEPA cases. 67
Lucy Karl
67. Only a few decisions have come down citing Strycker's Bay. They suggest
that courts are not giving the case great weight. In National Center for Preservation
Law v. Landrieu, 496 F. Supp. 716 (D.S.C. 1980), aff'd 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1980),
plaintiffs asked the court to examine the adequacy of an EIS. Citing Strycker's Bay,
the court said its role is to examine the statement to determine whether it contains
sufficient information to allow the decisionmaker to make a reasoned choice. Id. at
724.
In Aersten v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314 (D. Mass. 1980), a ffd 637 F.2d 12 (1st
Cir. 1980), plaintiffs contended that NEPA required HUD to draw up a full EIS. The
court had ruled at an earlier date that HUD's decision not to draw up an EIS was
reasonable. The district court, in a footnote, discussed the standards of review ap-
plied in the various circuits. Id. at 321 n.4. It pointed out that some courts apply an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard while others apply a "reasonableness" standard.
1d. It decided that, because the Supreme Court never expressly articulated the appro-
priate standard of review, it would apply the "reasonableness" standard ignoring lan-
guage in Kleppe which could possibly foreclose its use. Id.
In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980), the district
court relied upon Strycker's Bay as well as Vermont Yankee, Kleppe, and other lower
court cases. It found that a court's role in examining an EIS is to determine whether
there is sufficient detail to allow the decisionmaker to make a reasoned choice. Id. at
345.
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